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QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the Court of Appeals wrongly decide, in conflict with prior decisions of the

Utah Supreme Court, that a witness who presents negative whistle testimony (i.e., a witness
who testifies that a train whistle was not sounded) need only be in a physical position to hear
the whistle and not in a mental position to hear the whistle? By "mental position" Union
Pacific refers to the Utah Supreme Court's requirement that a negative whistle witness must
not be so engrossed in or diverted to other things that the witness would have heard a train
whistle had it been sounded.
2.

Did the Court of Appeals wrongly decide, on an important question of law which

has not yet but should be settled by the Utah Supreme Court, that a negative whistle witness
does not need to lay a foundation showing that the witness was in a physical and mental
position to have heard the train whistle had it been sounded? Encompassed within this
question is the subsidiary question of whether Union Pacific presented evidence that Alecia
Jensen was not in a mental position to hear a whistle as she was engrossed in other matters,
and whether Jensen presented contrary evidence making this an issue of fact for the jury?
3.

Did the Court of Appeals wrongly decide, on an important question of law which

has not yet but should be settled by the Utah Supreme Court, that an affidavit filed in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment that is inconsistent with previously served
interrogatory answers creates an issue of fact sufficient to preclude entry of summary
judgment? Encompassed within this question is the subsidiary question of whether the Court
of Appeals wrongly decided that Jensen's affidavit submitted in opposition to summary
1

judgment was not inconsistent with her interrogatory answers?
OPINION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment on two grounds and reversed
on a third ground in Jensen v. Union Pacific Rfli1rQfKl, Case No. 950754-CA, Memorandum
Decision, dated April 25, 1996. A copy of the decision is included as part of the Appendix.
JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals' Memorandum Decision which is sought to be reviewed is
dated April 25, 1996. A motion for rehearing was denied by order dated May 17, 1996. A
copy of the order denying rehearing is included as part of the Appendix.
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Supreme Court by Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) (1953 as amended).
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS
Because of the length of Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (1994 as amended), it has been
reproduced and included as part of the Appendix.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, and Disposition:
Alecia Jensen originally sued Union Pacific for a claim arising from a train/auto
accident which occurred in Springville, Utah where Jensen was thrownfromher automobile
upon impact with a Union Pacific locomotive. Union Pacific brought a Motion For Summary
Judgment in the Fourth Judicial District Court, Utah County (hereinafter "trial court").
2

Summary Judgment was granted on May 15, 1995 in a Memorandum Decision with an Order
Granting Summary Judgment dated June 9, 1995. A copy of the trial court's Memorandum
Decision and Order are included as part of the Appendix. An appeal was made by Jensen.
The Utah Supreme Court assigned the case to the Utah Court of Appeals. That court affirmed
the summary judgment on two grounds and reversed on a third ground in a Memorandum
Decision dated April 25, 1996 (hereinafter "Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision"). On
May 9,1996 defendant filed a Petition For Rehearing. The Court of Appeals entered its Order
denying the Petition on May 17, 1996.
Statement of Facts
Jensen, age 17, was seriously injured when the automobile in which she was riding as
a passenger drove in front of and was struck by a Union Pacific coal train. The accident
occurred at approximately 12:10 p.m. on February 5, 1994, at a public railroad crossing of
Union Pacific's Provo Subdivision mainline trackage located near 650 West and 5950 South
in Spanish Fork. (Utah County Sheriffs Investigation File ("Sheriffs File"), R. 143-123).
According to Jensen's Interrogatory Answers (No. 14), Jensen's car, a 1982 Honda
Civic, had been purchased and was owned by Danny Jensen, Jensen's father, for Jensen's
personal use. The car was being driven at the time of the accident by Jensen's boyfriend,
Bruce Brinkmeier, also age 17. Brinkmeier was not licensed to drive an automobile, and
received a citation for not being licensed following the accident. (Sheriffs File, R. 143-123).
Union Pacific engineer Puffer was sounding the locomotive whistle and bell as the train
approached the crossing. He began sounding the whistle and bell approximately 1/4 mile away
3

from the 5950 South crossing and continued to sound the whistle and bell from the 5950 South
crossing on up to the point of the accident at 650 West. The distance between the 5950 South
and 650 West crossings is approximately 1100 feet (Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98; Sheriffs
File, R. 143-123; Curley Affidavit, R. 121-106).
The whistle and bell were operating properly and the whistle was a particularly loud
whistle. The locomotive bell was also ringing. Engineer Puffer turned the bell on when he
started sounding the whistle for the 5950 South crossing. He never turned the bell off until
after the accident. Puffer operated the whistle and bell continuously from more than one
quarter mile away up to the point of the accident. (Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98).
Shortly after seeing a truck/horse trailer clear the crossing, Puffer noticed the Jensen
car rolling towards the crossing. The car was following a few seconds behind the truck/horse
trailer and moving past the stop sign. Puffer had the impression that the car never stopped for
the stop sign. The car rolled onto the track directly infrontof the train. (Puffer Affidavit, R.
102-98; Sheriffs File, R. 143-123).
According to Jensen's Interrogatory Answers (Nos. 15 and 35), Brinkmeier and Jensen
had comefromBrinkmeier's home in Salt Lake City, with Brinkmeier driving, to the place of
the accident. The purpose of the drive was to visit Brinkmeier's foster parents who lived in the
area and to see where Brinkmeier had worked just north of the crossing.
Brinkmeier's deposition was never taken nor did he give an affidavit.

However

according to a recorded statement of Brinkmeier, a transcription of which was attached as an
exhibit to Jensen's Memorandum in Opposition to Union Pacific's Motion (R. 178-158),
4

Brinkmeier and Jensen were playing a "wish" game upon arrival at the crossing. They did so
by lifting their feet up off the floor of the car and touching something metallic with their
fingers while at the same time making a wish and crossing the tracks. Jensen agrees that they
may have been doing mat. (Brinkmeier Statement, R. 168-166; Affidavit of Alecia Jensen
("Jensen Affidavit"), R. 181-180).
Brinkmeier and Jensen never saw nor heard the train at any time before impact. They
were playing the game and looking in a forward and/or upward direction to try and find a metal
screw to touch as the car was at or near the stop sign. They did not look or listen for train
traffic because of being preoccupied with playing the game. (Jensen Affidavit, R. 181-180;
Sheriffs File, R. 143-123).
In Jensen's Answer to Interrogatory No. 25, which specifically requested that she
identify "any and all obstructions to your vision of the train's approach and railroad crossing,"
Jensen answered: "I do not recall if the view was obstructed." (R. 265). In her subsequent
affidavit in response to Union Pacific's Motion for Summary Judgment, Jensen recalled "that
there were a lot of trucks and trailers which obstructed our view of the tracks in all directions."
(Jensen Affidavit, R. 181).
In Jensen's Answer to Interrogatory No. 26, responding to the question of how the
accident happened, she stated: "I remember nothing of the accident and very little, if anything,
of what happened prior to the accident." (R. 218). In her affidavit later submitted in
opposition to Union Pacific's Motion for Summary Judgment, Jensen stated that she did not
recall playing the wish game, although she may have been, but did remember traffic congestion
5

at the crossing which obstructed the view of the tracks in all directions; and did recall never
hearing or seeing the train. (Jensen Affidavit, R. 181-180); Court of Appeals Memorandum
Decision at 4. This contradictory statement was Jensen's only evidence of noise and traffic
congestion at the crossing and that the whistle was not sounded.
Brinkmeier, in his recorded statement attached to Jensen's Memorandum in Opposition,
stated that he was "not paying attention" at the crossing and "never heard anything." (R. 164).
Independent witnesses Gerald and Whitney Hill and Johnny Starks were interviewed
by the Utah County Sheriffs Office. They provided written statements to the Sheriffs Office
but no depositions or affidavits were obtained in the lawsuit. The Hills made no reference to
whether the whistle was or was not sounded-the subject was not addressed at all. However,
Starks advised that, "I heard the train honking." (Sheriffs File, R. 139, 135, 134, 131).
ARGUMENT
Question No. 1. Did the Court of Appeals wrongly decide, in conflict with prior
decisions of the Utah Supreme Court, that a witness who presents negative whistle
testimony (i.e., a witness who testifies that a train whistle was not sounded) need only be
in a physical position to hear the whistle and not in a mental position to hear the whistle?
By "mental position" Union Pacific refers to the Utah Supreme Court's requirement that
a negative whistle witness must not be so engrossed in or diverted to other things that the
witness would have heard a train whistle had it been sounded.
In reversing the trial court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of whether Union
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Pacific complied with Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (1994), requiring the blowing of a whistle
or ringing of a bell when approaching a railroad crossing, the Court of Appeals held that an
issue of fact existed based on Jensen's negative whistle testimony; i.e., that she did not hear
the whistle blow. The Court of Appeals held:
It is not necessary for plaintiffs to establish that witnesses were
affirmatively listening for the warnings or "paying particular
attention to the thing observed [or not observed]." Seybold v.
Union Pacific R.R.. 121 Utah 61, 66, 239 P.2d 174, 177 (1951).
ff,
All that need appear is that the witness was so situated in
relation to the train at the time it is claimed the warnings were
given that said warnings would have awakened her attention to
them."' Curtis V. Haimon Ekes, Inc. 575 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah
1978) (quoting Hudson v. Union Pacific R.R.. 120 Utah 245, 251,
233 P.2d 357, 360 (1951)).
Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision at 3.
In so holding, the Court of Appeals misinterpreted this Court's test clearly enunciated
in Curtis v. Harmon Elecs.r Inc., that although a negative whistle witness need not be
specifically listening for a train whistle, as would someone approaching the track in a dense
fog, the person must have a physical position sufficient to allow the person to hear a whistle
if it was sounded and a mental position sufficient to allow the person to hear a whistle if it was
sounded; i.e., the person must not be so engrossed in or diverted to other things that she would
have heard a train whistle had it been sounded. Sfi£ Curtis. 575 P.2d at 1047 wherein this
Court explained the mental position requirement repeatedly:
On the other hand, where it appears the person whose
negative testimony is offered was paying attention to another
matter, such as another noisy passing train, his testimony is not of

value. IdL citing Jensen v. Oregon Short Line, 59 Utah 367,204

P. 101 (1922) (emphasis added).
In Clark v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.. supra, this Court stated:
Though a witness was not specially listening for
signals, or giving special attention to the
occurrence, yet, if his attention was not engrossed
or diverted to other things, and it being made to
appear that he was in [a] position to hear, and in all
likelihood would have heard them had they been
given, his testimony that he heard none is still of
probative value, and is not to be disregarded,....
This Court affirmed that view in Hudson v. Union Pacific
Railroad Co.. in which we noted it was not necessary for the
plaintiff to show the person was affirmatively listening for the
whistle. We stated:
All that need appear is that the witness was so situated in
relation to the train at the time it is claimed the warnings were
given that said warnings would have awakened her attention to
them... [The witness] was in a position where it is likely that she
would have heard the whistle, or at least the bell, and as there is
no evidence that her attention was so absorbed in other matters
that she would not have heard, a jury question is presented.
Curtis. 575 P.2d at 1047. (Footnotes omitted, emphasis added.)1

*See also. Hudson v. Union Pacific R.R. Co.. 120 Utah 245, 233 P.2d 357, 360-61
(1951). Although a plaintiff need not show that she was affirmatively listening or paying
attention to determine whether the train was going to whistle or not, her mental position is
important:
All that need appear is that the witness was so situated in relation to the train
at the time it is claimed the warnings were given that said warnings would
have awakened her attention to them. The circumstances bearing on her
opportunity and capacity to hear, such as possible deafness, pronounced wind
direction affecting sounds, the speed and noise of the train and of the car,
topography of the surrounding country, absorption in conversation or with her
own thoughts or devices and any other factors which would enable the fact
8

Significantly, this is the position taken by Judge Greenwood of the panel of the Court
of Appeals that decided this case. Judge Greenwood, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
would hold that plaintiff need show that she was paying sufficient attention to have heard the
warnings if they were sounded. Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision at 5 citing the same
cases cited by the majority for the opposing view.
In restating the proposition that a person need not be specifically listening for a warning
or paying particular attention to the thing observed, the Court of Appeals goes too far when
it eliminates the requirement that a person still needs to be in a non-distracted mental position
that would enable them to hear a whistle. There is a significant difference between the
requirement that a person be affirmatively listening and the requirement that a person not be
distracted or diverted so that she cannot hear. By failing to make this distinction, the Court
of Appeals ruling significantly changes the test for negative whistle testimony which should

finder to evaluate the probative force of her testimony should be considered.
The convincing power of testimony that a sound was not heard varies
according to the opportunity of the witness giving it to hear and observe, but
a passenger in an automobile need not persistently keep his ear cocked for the
sound of a train. In this case the plaintiff is necessarily confined to negative
evidence in proving the fact that the whistle or bell was not sounded. If such
evidence is unworthy of belief simply because it is negative, then a plaintiff
in like circumstances must nearly always fail. The issue is fundamentally a
question of the credibility of witnesses and considering the close proximity of
the car to the train while they travelled parallel to each other, Mrs. Hudson

was in a position where it is likely that she would have heard the whistle, or
at least the bell, and as there is no evidence that her attention was so absorbed
in other matters that she would not have heard a jury question is presented.
(Emphasis added.)
9

be corrected by this Court. It is important for this Court to revisit the issue to prevent future
misunderstandings of the test to be applied. ££., Bebout v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.. 982
F.2d 1178, 1179-80 (7th Cir. 1993) (explicitly setting forth a two part test of physical position
and mental position).
Question No. 2. Did the Court of Appeals wrongly decide, on an important question
of law which has not yet but should be settled by the Utah Supreme Court, that a negative
whistle witness does not need to lay a foundation showing that the witness was in a
physical and mental position to have heard the train whistle had it been sounded?
Encompassed within this question is the subsidiary question of whether Union Pacific
presented evidence that Alecia Jensen was not in a mental position to hear a whistle as she
was engrossed in other matters, and whether Jensen presented contrary evidence making
this an issue of fact for the jury?
If this Court should correct the Court of Appeals' departure from its negative whistle
testimony standard, the issue arises as to whether the negative whistle witness has the burden
to lay a foundation showing that she was in a physical and mental position to have heard the
train whistle had it been sounded.
The Court of Appeals held:
Union Pacific also claims Jensen's affidavit did not include
statements that she was paying sufficient attention to have heard
the whistle had it been sounded. Despite the dissent's acceptance
of this argument, we can find no Utah law requiring nonmoving
parties to lay such an evidentiary foundation in an affidavit
opposing summary judgment. Nonmoving parties need only
10

controvert the moving party's assertions, thus creating a genuine
issue of fact.
Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision at 4.
Contrary to the Court of Appeals assertion, nonmoving parties are required to lay an
evidentiaiy foundation in affidavits opposing summary judgment. Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, requires that supporting and opposing affidavits "shall be made on personal
knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." (Emphasis
added.) For Jensen to meet this requirement she must show, through laying of a proper
foundation for her conclusion that she heard no whistle and therefore no whistle was blown,
and that she is competent to testify to that matter because she was in a physical and a mental
position to hear. Otherwise, a plaintiff could oppose a summary judgment with numerous
affidavits saying no whistle was blown even though at trial it turns out that the witnesses were
miles away, involved in a noisy environment, or engaged in something which completely
occupied their attention like talking on a cellular phone. Each person could truthfully say, ,fI
heard no whistle," but this would be meaningless without a foundation showing they could
have heard a whistle had it been blown.
This Court has stated that affiants must assert specific facts not mere assertions or
conclusions. Sfi£, £ * , Butterfield v. Qkubo. 831 P.2d 97, 102-103 (Utah 1992) ("Utah has
long required nonexpert rule 56 affiants to enumerate the specific evidentiary facts in support
of their conclusions

In recent years, we have made clear that this standard also applies to
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a situation in which the affiant testifies as an expert."); Webster v. SilL 675 P.2d 1170, 1172
(Utah 1983) (in response to a motion for summary judgment the mere assertion that an issue
of fact exists without a proper evidentiary foundation to support that assertion is insufficient
to preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion). Requiring Jensen to set forth an
evidentiary foundation for her negative whistle testimony is a logical extension of this rule.2
It is important for the Supreme Court to make this extension. The Court of Appeals
sanctions the opposing of a proper summary judgment motion with a mere conclusion. Such
a lessening of the requirement in opposing summary judgments will have an effect far beyond
this case. If a proper foundation for a conclusion does not exist there is no sense in prolonging
the litigation, forcing the parties and the trial court to spend more time and money when the
case could be resolved summarily.
Encompassed within this question is the subsidiary questions of whether Union Pacific
presented evidence that Jensen was not in a mental position to hear a whistle as she was
engrossed in other matters, and whether Jensen presented contrary evidence making this an
issue of fact for the jury.
Given the fact that the Court of Appeals rejected the proposition that a foundation must
2

This topic has been discussed but not explicitly ruled on. £fi£ Broadwater v. Old
Republic Surety, 854 P.2d 527, 533-34 (Utah 1993), discussing objections to affidavits
submitted in support of a motion for summary judgment because, in part, the affidavits
contained facts not supported by an adequate foundation. The court apparently gave
credence to the argument although no holding was made regarding the necessity of a
foundation or affidavit in support. See also. State v. Shama Resources Ltd. Partnership. 899
P.2d 977, 980-81 (Idaho 1995), allowing affidavits containing a proper foundation and
rejecting affidavits that were in part, unsupported by any factual basis or foundation.
12

be laid without determining if a proper foundation was laid, should this Court decide that an
evidentiary foundation must be laid it should reexamine the question of whether a proper
foundation was laid by Jensen. This reexamination would promote judicial economy as the
question can be answered based on the record before this Court.
Union Pacific presented evidence before the trial court and referred to that evidence
before the Court of Appeals that Jensen was distracted and involved in playing a "wish" game
which diverted her attentionfromthe oncoming train. See statement of facts, supra. Jensen
confirmed in her affidavit that she may have been playing this game although she did not
specifically remember. LsL On the other hand, Jensen said nothing in her affidavit showing
that she was sufficiently alert so that she would have heard the train whistle had it been blown.
Even under the Court of Appeals1 relaxed standard, Jensen's affidavit is not sufficient as she
said nothing to contradict the fact that she was so engrossed in the "wish" game that had a
whistle been blown it would have awakened her attention to it. She merely said that she heard
no whistle.
Judge Greenwood of the Court of Appeals found that no proper foundation existed. In
dissent, Judge Greenwood stated: "In my view, plaintiff did not adequately rebut defendant's
evidence that such warnings were sounded

Plaintiffs affidavit that she did not hear any

warnings, and may have been playing a "wish" game at the time of the collision, is bereft of
assertions she was paying sufficient attention to have heard the warnings if they were sounded.
Consequently, I would affirm the trial court's decision in its entirety." Court of Appeals
Memorandum Decision at 5-6 (emphasis in original). Given the record and the dissent's
13

findings on the issue not examined by the majority, it would be proper to reinstate the trial
court's grant of summary judgment.
Question No. 3. Did the Court of Appeals wrongly decide, on an important question
of law which has not yet but should be settled by the Utah Supreme Court, that an
affidavit filed in opposition to a motion for summary judgment that is inconsistent with
previously served interrogatory answers creates an issue of fact sufficient to preclude
entry of summary judgment? Encompassed within this question is the subsidiary question
of whether the Court of Appeals wrongly decided that Jensen's affidavit submitted in
opposition to summary judgment was not inconsistent with her interrogatory answers?
The Court of Appeals held that Jensen's affidavit, submitted in opposition to Union
Pacific's Motion For Summary Judgment, did not contradict her prior sworn interrogatory
answers because Union Pacific did not specifically ask whether Jensen heard the whistle.
Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision at 4. In a footnote, the court made a questionable
ruling regarding whether a party opposing summary judgment can contradict prior testimony.
The court ruled that answers to interrogatories, like affidavits, are sworn statements made
without cross examination and that one sworn statement is not more probative than another
merely because it was made first. Court of Appeals Memorandum Decision at 4 n.2. This
implies that interrogatory answers can be contradicted with impunity any time a motion for
summary judgment is brought.
The Court of Appeals' ruling is in conflict with established Supreme Court precedent

14

insofar as it allows prior testimony to be contradicted. To the extent that this Court has not
ruled specifically on the issue of prior interrogatory answers being contradicted by a
subsequent affidavit, this Court should lay the matter to rest consistent with its rulings that
prior deposition answers may not be contradicted by a subsequent affidavit
It is well established in Utah that when a party takes a clear position in a deposition he
may not thereafter raise an issue of fact defeating a motion for summary judgment by filing
an affidavit which contradicts his deposition unless he can provide an explanation of the
discrepancy. See, &&, Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983); Gawv.Stateof
Utah 798 P.2d 1130, 1140 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The reason for such a rule is not that
depositions are more reliable due to the opportunity to cross examine. In a motion for
summary judgment, deposition testimony receives no more weight than an affidavit. See
Webster. 675 P.2d at 1172. The proper reason is that a contrary rule would undermine the
utility of summary judgment as a means for screening out sham issues of fact. LL at 1173.
Otherwise, a party who goes through discovery, establishes the facts of a case and then moves
for summary judgment will find that the opponent can change the facts by submitting an
affidavit contradicting any admissions previously made. In effect, the opponent creates a sham
issue of fact-which version of his testimony should be believed. See generally. Mays v. CibaGeigyCorp.. 661 P.2d 348, 351-355 (Kan. 1983).
Although this rule has not been specifically applied to affidavits contradicting
interrogatory answers in Utah, the reasoning still applies and should be extended as it has been
by other courts. See, £&, Dilberti v. U.S.. 817 F.2d 1259, 1263 (7th Cir. 1987) (affidavit
15

contradicting sworn statement in a military document rejected. "It is well established that a
party cannot create a genuine issue of fact by submitting an affidavit containing conclusory
allegations which contradict plain admissions in prior deposition or otherwise sworn
testimony.") It does not matter that interrogatory answers are not subject to cross examination
or that they are a sworn statement similar to an affidavit. What matters is that interrogatory
answers are a discovery device used to pin down facts. Once an answer is made and relied
upon in a summary judgment motion the opposing party should not be allowed to create a
sham issue of fact by simply contradicting the prior answer. The reasoning preventing
contradiction without explanation applies whether the original testimony is a deposition,
interrogatory answer, a sworn statement in a police report or any other sworn method of setting
forth a statement of fact.
Encompassed within this question is the subsidiary question of whether the Court of
Appeals wrongly decided that Jensen's affidavit submitted in opposition to summary judgment
was not inconsistent with her interrogatory answers. Union Pacific submits that Jensen's
subsequent affidavit which states she recalls not hearing the whistle is clearly contradictory
of her earlier interrogatory answer that she remembered little or nothing of the accident.
This is an important question for this Court to review because the Court of Appeals has
established the principle that a party may not ask a general question in discovery, such as the
question asked here as to how the accident happened to which Jensen responded "I remember
nothing of the accident and very litde, if anything, of what happened prior to the accident" (R.
218), but instead must ask numerous and exhaustive questions regarding every conceivable fact
16

of the case. For example, Union Pacific would have been required to ask: did the accident
happen because you were preoccupied, did the accident happen because you didn't see the
train, did the accident happen because you didn't hear the train, did the accident happen
because you could not stop in time, did the accident happen because the street was wet, etc.
Such specific questions would be never ending and might never get to the truth that a general,
broad question would elicit.
Such a process as the Court of Appeals implicitly requires, that of not being able to rely
on answers to general questions, would be so unwieldy as to be unusable. In addition,
summary judgments would be more difficult to bring because a party could escape prior
answers by asserting that general answers in response to discovery do not preclude different
answers in later filed affidavits as the general question was not specific enough. This Court
should act to correct this situation.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals has changed established precedent with regard to negative whistle
testimony. The Court of Appeals has also ruled incorrectly on several legal questions which
should be decided by this Court in accordance with related rulings. Union Pacific respectfully
requests that this Court grant the petition for certiorari.
DATED this 14th day of June, 1996.

J^Ckre Williams
Morris 0 Haggerty
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JACKSON, Judge:
Alicia Jensen appeals the trial court's grant of summary
judgment in favor of Union Pacific Railroad, Inc. (Union
Pacific). We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
We review grants of summary judgment for correctness. See
Hiqqins v. Salt Lake County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993). "We
do not defer to the trial court's conclusion that facts are
undisputed nor its legal conclusions supported by those facts."
Oquirrh Assocs. v. First Nat'1 Leasing Co.. 888 P.2d 659, 662
(Utah App. 1994). Jensen raises three issues on appeal. We
address each in turn.
First, Jensen claims Union Pacific was negligent because
event recorders show the train was traveling up to 1.3 miles per
hour in excess of its maximum timetable speed of 50 miles per
hour just minutes before the accident. Excessive speed of a
train or other vehicle is the cause of an accident only when it
prevents the driver from slowing down, stopping, or controlling
the vehicle to avoid the collision, or when it misleads the
driver of another vehicle. See Horsley v. Robinson. 112 Utah
227, 239-41, 186 P.2d 592, 597-99 (1947); see also Dombeck v.
Chicago. M.. St. P. & Pac. Ry.. 129 N.W.2d 185, 193 (Wis. 1964)
(holding refusal to submit question of train's speed to jury

correct because evidence could not support finding that excessive
speed was causal).
Jensen assumes that had the train been traveling one or two
miles per hour slower, it could have stopped or slowed
sufficiently to avoid the accident. "Trains cannot be stopped in
time to avoid collisions if the time interval is shortened to a
matter of . . . seconds." Van Wagoner v. Union Pac. R.R.. 112
Utah 189, 203-04, 186 P.2d 293, 301 (1947). Former Justice
Crockett declared:
It is contrary to the generally known laws of
physics and common sense to expect the train,
with its great weight and momentum, to stop
within the short distance available after the
instant it should have become apparent that
[the plaintiff] was not going to stop. After
that point was reached, there is nothing the
crew could have done to avoid the collision.
And this true whether the train was
travelling fast or slow and whether the crew
saw [the plaintiff] or not.
Gregory v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.. 8 Utah 2d 114, 118, 329
P.2d 407, 409 (1958) (Crockett, J., concurring). Thus, a train's
speed generally cannot be the cause of crossing collisions as a
matter of law.
Further, in the present case, the train's speed was well
within the federally mandated 60-miles-per-hour limit for the
track in question. See 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) (1994). The train's
speed was also within Union Pacific's timetable speed limit.
Speed indicators on trains must be accurate within plus-or-minus
5 miles per hour at speeds over 3 0 miles per hour. See 4 9 C.F.R.
§ 229.117 (1994). Thus, the speed indicator's reading of 51.3
miles per hour places the train within Union Pacific's timetable
speed limit of 50 miles per hour. Jensen cannot prove negligence
per se based simply on a reading of 1.3 miles per hour over the
50-miles-per-hour maximum. Such a claim would have to be based
on a reading in excess of 55 miles per hour. The trial court
correctly determined Jensen's claim of negligent train speed must
fail as a matter of law, and we affirm the trial court's ruling
on that issue.1
1. We do not address Union Pacific's contention that federal law
preempts Jensen's claim of negligent train speed under CSX
Transp.. Tnc. v. Easterwood. 507 U.S. 658, 113 S. Ct. 1732
(1993). Like the trial court, we conclude the train's speed
could not have been a cause of the accident as a matter of law.
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Second, Jensen asserts the crossing was more than ordinarily
hazardous because a Utah Livestock Auction is held nearby on a
weekly basis, creating traffic congestion and noise sufficient to
obstruct the view of and muffle warning signals of on-coming
trains. Liability of railroads for more-than-ordinarilyhazardous crossings is limited to obstructions either created by
the railroad or located on the railroad's right of way. See
Duncan v. Union Pac. R.R.. 842 P.2d 832, 834 (Utah 1992); Gleave
v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R.. 749 P.2d 660, 663-64 (Utah App.
1988) . Any obstructions making the instant crossing more than
ordinarily hazardous were beyond the control of Union Pacific.
Union Pacific did not create any obstruction at the crossing, and
its right of way was free of obstructions. The trial court
correctly determined Jensen could not establish liability for a
more than ordinarily hazardous crossing as a matter of law, and
we affirm the trial court's ruling on that issue.
Third, Jensen contends Union Pacific is negligent because it
failed to comply with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 56-114 (1994). Utah law requires trains to sound warnings beginning
one-quarter mile before every grade crossing. It is not
necessary for plaintiffs to establish that witnesses were
affirmatively listening for the warnings or "paying particular
attention to the thing observed [or not observed]." Seybold v.
Union Pac. R.R., 121 Utah 61, 66, 239 P.2d 174, 177 (1951).
"'All that need appear is that the witness was so situated in
relation to the train at the time it is claimed the warnings were
given that said warnings would have awakened her attention to
them."' Curtis v. Harmon Elecs.. Inc.. 575 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah
1978) (quoting Hudson v. Union Pac. R.R.. 120 Utah 245, 251, 233
P.2d 357, 360 (1951)). Additionally, whether a train sounded
required warnings has been a factual question for juries to
decide since before statehood. See, e.g., Smith v. Rio Grande W.
Ry.. 9 Utah 141, 143, 33 P. 626, 627 (1893).
In response to Union Pacific's motion for summary judgment,
Jensen submitted an affidavit in which she stated she did not
hear the train whistle. "' [I]t only takes one sworn statement
under oath to dispute the averments on the other side of the
controversy and create an issue fact.*" Draper City v. Estate of
Bernardo. 888 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1995) (quoting Holbrook Co.
v. Adams. 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975)). Nonmoving parties need
not rebut affidavit evidence at the summary judgment stage of
litigation, they need only controvert such statements and thus
create a genuine issue of material fact. See Utah R. Civ. P.
56(c). We also observe
[w]hile generally positive testimony (such as
I heard the whistle) is better than negative
testimony (such as I did not hear the
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whistle) the district court may not accept
positive testimony to the exclusion of
negative "estimony on a motion for summary
judgment. It is a credibility question
whether one witness' memory is more reliable
than another witness* memory, and such
credibility determinations are not to be made
on a motion for summary judgment.
Easterwood v. CSX Transp.. Inc., 933 F.2d 1548, 1560 n.14 (11th
Cir. 1991), aff'd. 507 U.S. 658, 676, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 1744
(1993) (emphasis added).
Union Pacific claims Jensen cannot rely on her affidavit to
create an issue of fact because it contradicts her previous
answers to interrogatories.2 However, Union Pacific's
interrogatories did not specifically ask whether Jensen heard the
whistle; thus, her affidavit does not contradict her prior sworn
statements. Union Pacific also claims Jensen's affidavit did not
include statements that she was paying sufficient attention to
have heard the whistle had it been sounded. Despite the
dissent's acceptance of this argument, we can find no Utah law
requiring nonmoving parties to lay such an evidentiary foundation
in an affidavit opposing summary judgment. Nonmoving parties
need only controvert the moving party's assertions, thus creating
a genuine issue of fact. Accordingly, the trial court
incorrectly determined that no genuine issues of material fact
existed on the question of whether tne train sounded warnings as
required by Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (1994), and we reverse the
trial court's ruling on that issue.
In sum, we affirm the trial court's rulings on the issues of
the train's excessive speed and Union Pacific's liability for a
more-than-ordinarily-hazardous crossing. We reverse the trial
court's ruling on the question of whether Union Pacific complied

2. The rule relating to affidavits that contradict prior sworn
testimony grows from cases in which an affidavit contradicts an
earlier deposition. Courts have reasoned that deposition
testimony is more reliable than an affidavit because it is
subject to cross examination. See, e.g., Webster v. Sill, 675
P.2d 1170, 1172-73 (Utah 1983). Such is not the case here.
Answers to interrogatories, like affidavits, are sworn statements
made without cross examination; one sworn statement is not more
probative than another merely because it was made first.
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with Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 (1994) and remand the matter for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I CONCUR:

Michael J. Wilkins, Judge

GREENWOOD, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I concur in the majority opinion's analysis regarding the
speed of the train and whether the crossing was more than
ordinarily hazardous. I respectfully dissent, however, from the
majority's determination that there is a material issue of fact
on the question of whether the defendant complied with Utah Code
Ann. § 56-1-14 (1994) by sounding the required warnings. In my
view, plaintiff did not adequately rebut defendant's evidence
that such warnings were sounded. Caselaw in Utah and elsewhere
regarding the probative value of negative testimony in similar
cases holds that the witness must have been positioned so "it is
reasonable to suppose he would have observed had it occurred or
the fact existed." Seybold v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 121 Utah 61,
66, 239 P.2d 174, 177 (1951). See also, Curtis v. Harmon Elecs..
Inc.f 575 P.2d 1044, 1047 (Utah 1978) (noting that witness's
testimony valueless when attention elsewhere); Hudson v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co.. 120 Utah 245, 251, 233 P.2d 357, 360 (1951)
(noting that witness must be situated so that warnings would have
"awakened her attention to them"); Bebout v. Norfolk & Western
Ry. Co.. 982 F.2d 1178, 1179-80 (7th Cir. 1993) (discussing
Illinois rule that negative evidence is probative only if witness
close enough to hear and is paying sufficient attention to have
heard).
Plaintiff's affidavit that she did not hear any warnings,
and may have been playing a "wish" game at the time of the
collision, is bereft of assertions she was paying sufficient
attention to have heard the warnings if they were sounded.
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Consequently, I would affirm the trial court's decision in its
entirety.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge
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56-1-14. Procedures at grade crossings.
Every locomotive shall be provided with a bell which shall be rung continuously from a point not less than eighty rods from any city or town street or
public highway grade crossing until such city or town street or public highway
grade crossing shall be crossed, but, except in towns and at terminal points, the
sounding of the locomotive whistle or siren at least one-fourth of a mile before
reaching any such grade crossing shall be deemed equivalent to ringing the
bell as aforesaid; during the prevalence of fogs, snow and dust storms, the
locomotive whistle shall be sounded before each street crossing while passing
through cities and towns. All locomotives with or without trains before crossing
the main track at grade of any other railroad must come to a full stop at a
distance not exceeding 400 feet from the crossing, and must not proceed until
the way is known to be clear; two blasts of the whistle or two sounds of the
siren shall be sounded at the moment of starting; provided, that whenever
interlocking signal apparatus and derailing switches or any other crossing
protective device approved by the Department of Transportation is adopted
such stop shall not be required.
Provided, that local authorities in their respective jurisdiction may by
ordinance approved by the Department of Transportation provide more restricted sounding of bells or whistles or sirens than is provided herein and may
prescribe points different from those herein set forth at which such signals
shall be given and may further restrict such ringing of bells or sounding of
whistles or sirens so as to provide for either the ringing of a bell or the
sounding of a whistle or of a siren or the elimination of the sounding of such
bells or whistles or sirens or either of them, except in case of emergency.
The term locomotive as used herein shall mean every self-propelled steam
engine, electrically propelled interurban car and so-called diesel operated
locomotive.
Every person in charge of a locomotive violating the provisions of this section
is guilty of a misdemeanor, and the railroad company shall be liable for all
damages which any person may sustain by reason of such violation.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM DECISION

ALECIA JENSEN,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 940400280
DATE May 15, 1995

vs.

JUDGE BOYD L. PARK

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, INC.,
Defendant.
This matter came before the Court on April 17, 1995 for oral argument on
defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. The Court, having received and reviewed the
motion, memorandum in support, memorandum in opposition, reply memorandum, and
supplemental reply memorandum; having heard oral arguments; and having reviewed the
applicable law, now makes the following findings and conclusions:
1.

This Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. Although plaintiff is a resident of

Salt Lake County, State of Utah, defendant Union Pacific Railroad is a Utah corporation
authorized to do business in the State of Utah and in Utah County, State of Utah. The
accident which gave rise to this cause of action occurred in Utah County, State of Utah, and
therefore jurisdiction and venue are properly vested in this Court.
2.

On February 5, 1994, the parties were involved in a collision between defendant's

train and plaintiffs automobile. Plaintiff was a passenger in her automobile, which was
crossing the railroad tracks at approximately 5950 South 650 West in Utah County when the
automobile was struck by a train owned and operated by defendant. Plaintiff alleges she
suffered severe and permanent injuries as a direct and proximate result of this collision.
3.

On February 7, 1995 defendant filed with this Court a Motion For Summary

Judgment and an accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion
For Summary Judgment. On March 2, 1995 plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to
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Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment and a Request for Hearing on Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. On March 15,
1995 Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment was
filed. On April 12, 1995 Defendant's Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion For Summary Judgment was filed with the Court. Oral arguments on this motion
were heard on April 17, 1995.
4.

The accident giving rise to this cause of action occurred at approximately 12:10

p.m. on February 5, 1994 at a public railroad crossing of defendant's Provo Subdivision
mainline trackage located near 650 West and 5950 South in Spanish Fork, Utah County. At
the time of the accident, plaintiffs automobile was being driven by plaintiffs boyfriend,
Bruce Brinkmeier, also a minor at the time of the accident. Brinkmeier was cited for driving
without a license. The train in question was an empty coal train with three locomotives and
46 trailing empty coal cars. The train weighed 1424 tons and was 2622 feet in length.
5.

According to the train's engineer, the train was traveling from Milford to Provo in

a southwest to northeast direction. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, defendant's Memorandum
in Support, Exhibit D. The trackage at that location is relatively straight and flat. See
Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at f 5(e).
Plaintiffs automobile was traveling southbound on 650 West. The road (650 West) is
straight and flat for hundreds of feet before reaching the crossing. Id. The trackage and
road intersect at an angle greater than 90 degrees with reference to the directions of approach
of the train and car. Id. at ^ 5(a).
6.

The crossing is located in a rural farming area and is surrounded by open fields on

the approach side. A Utah Livestock Auction building and animal pens are located in the
southwest quadrant of the crossing intersection, which is on the opposite side of the tracks
from which plaintiffs automobile approached. The northwest quadrant, which is the view
quadrant for the approaching train and car, is an open field. See Affidavit of Lawrence
Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B. At the time of the accident, a
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livestock auction was taking place. There was a considerable amount of traffic, and trucks
and trailers were parked near the crossing.
7.

An advance stop sign warning sign was posted alongside 650 West approximately

572 feet north of the crossing. Also posted were an advance railroad crossing warning sign,
an advance railroad crossing sign painted on the road, railroad crossing "crossbuck" signs,
and a stop sign. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support,
Exhibit B.
8.

Defendant alleges that its engineer began sounding the locomotive whistle and bell

approximately 1/4 mile away from the 5950 South crossing and continued to sound them up
to the point of the accident at the 650 West crossing. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, ft 7-8,
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. The distance between the 5950 South and
650 West crossings is approximately 1,100 feet. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley,
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at f 5(b).
9.

At about the time the train passed over the 5950 South crossing, the engineer

noticed a truck pulling a horse trailer begin to drive over the tracks in a southbound
direction. Shortly after seeing the truck/horse trailer clear the crossing, the engineer noticed
plaintiff's automobile rolling towards the crossing. The car was following a few seconds
behind the truck/horse trailer and moving past the stop sign. The engineer placed the train in
emergency braking immediately upon seeing the car. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, ^ 911, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D.
10.

The train was a few hundred feet from the crossing when the engineer first saw

plaintiffs car approaching the intersection. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, f 10, defendant's
Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. It took the train approximately 1,400 feet to stop after
emergency braking was initiated. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's
Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at f 5(g). The left side of the snowplow of the leading
locomotive struck the right front portion of the car. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, 1 10,
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D; Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's
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Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at f 4(g)-(h). Both occupants were ejected from the car
and thrown in the same northeasterly direction. Neither occupant was wearing a seatbelt.
11.

Defendant alleges that plaintiff and Brinkmeier played a "wish" game upon arrival

at the crossing, lifting their feet from the floor of the car and looking for something metallic
within the car to touch with their fingers while simultaneously making a wish and crossing
the tracks. Plaintiff admits this, but asserts that she has no recollection of doing so just prior
to the collision. The parties agree, for the purpose of the summary judgment motion, that
plaintiff and Brinkmeier never saw or heard the train prior to impact.
12.

The parties agree that the "authorized speed limit" for the trackage in question was

set by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) at 60 m.p.h. for freight trains and 80
m.p.h. for passenger trains. However, defendant Union Pacific voluntarily filed with the
FRA a lower "timetable" speed of only 50 m.p.h. for its freight trains. Plaintiff argues that
it is this timetable speed that applies rather than the FRA's authorized speed limit of 60
m.p.h.
13.

Defendant claims that the train was traveling between 49 and 51 m.p.h. for at least

the last three miles before the engineer initiated emergency braking. See Affidavit of Ryan
Puffer, 1 5, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D; Affidavit of George E.
Ohisson, f 7, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F. Plaintiff argues that the train
was traveling an average speed of 51.5 m.p.h. for the three minutes prior to the collision.
See Affidavit of Dennis Andrews, f 8, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 2.
14.

Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact

exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See U.R.C.P. 56;
Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Furthermore, "[although summary judgment may on occasion be appropriate in negligence
cases, it is appropriate only in the most clear-cut case." Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d
126, 126 (1987) (citing Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982)).
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15.

Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment addresses three areas of analysis: 1)

Union Pacific was not negligent in traveling in excess of the timetable speed limit; 2) Union
Pacific did not fail to reduce the speed of its train through what plaintiff alleged to be a
"more than ordinarily hazardous crossing"; and 3) Union Pacific complied with requirements
of U.C.A. § 56-1-14, which governs the use of whistles and bells when approaching railroad
crossings. The Court will analyze these issues individually.
Authorized Speed Limit
16.

Although the FRA has set the speed limit for freight trains at 60 m.p.h., Union

Pacific has voluntarily chosen to set a lower "timetable" speed limit of 50 m.p.h. for its
freight trains, 10 m.p.h. below the speed limit mandated by the FRA. According to
plaintiffs accident reconstructionist, the train was averaging a speed of 51.5 m.p.h. for the
three minutes prior to the collision. See Affidavit of Dennis Andrews (Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit 2). At
oral arguments, plaintiff presented a speed graph obtained from the train's recorder. That
graph indicated variations in the train's speed prior to the accident, and recorded the train's
speed as varying from 50 m.p.h. to as much as 52.5 m.p.h.
17.

Based on data retrieved from the train's Pulse Electronics "speed recorder" device

which electronically recorded the train's speed on tape prior to the accident, defendant claims
that the train was traveling between 49 and 51 m.p.h. for at least the last three miles before
emergency braking was initiated. See Affidavit of George Ohlsson (defendant's
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment,
Exhibit F); see also Pulse Electronic printout (defendant's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit A). In the Affidavit of
George E. Ohlsson, Manager of Operating Practices for Union Pacific Railroad (see
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F), Mr. Ohlsson stated the following:
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It is difficult for even the most competent engineer to maintain a long and
heavy train at a certain and undeviating speed. The curvature and
undulation of the trackage will retard and increase the speed of a long and
heavy train even though an engineer is holding a steady throttle on the
locomotive. A train which travels for a number of miles at a speed which
does not deviate more than one or two miles an hour is, in my
professional opinion, going at a steady speed. It is simply not possible to
control a train's speed any better than that.
Id. at 1 8.
18.

Defendant argues that the FRA's "authorized speed limit" of 60 m.p.h. for freight

trains preempts plaintiff's claim of excessive speed. Defendant cites CSX Transportation,
Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S.Ct. 1732 (1993) in support of its argument that plaintiffs claims
of common law negligence are unfounded. In Easterwood, the plaintiff sued for the death of
her husband resulting from a railroad crossing accident, alleging that CSX was negligent
under Georgia law for failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing and for
operating the train at an excessive speed. The authorized speed limit for the track in
Easterwood was set at 60 m.p.h. and, while conceding that the train was traveling at a speed
under 60 m.p.h., Easterwood nevertheless claimed that CSX breached its common-law duty
to operate its train at a moderate and safe rate of speed.
19.

The federal regulations involved in Easterwood had been issued by the Secretary of

Transportation pursuant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), which
established an authorized speed limit of 60 m.p.h. for freight trains. A clause of the FRSA
permits states to adopt or continue in force any state law, rule, regulation, order, or standard
relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary adopted a regulation covering the
subject matter of such state requirement. The preemption clause of the FRSA (45 U.S.C.S.
§ 434) confers on the Secretary of Transportation the power to preempt state common law.
Given the Secretary's adoption of train-speed regulations pursuant to the FRSA (49 C.F.R. §
213.9(a)), a state's common-law restrictions on train speed are not preserved by a saving
clause in 45 U.S.C.S. § 434, under which a state may continue in force an additional or
Memorandum Decision 940400280
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more stringent law relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an
essentially local safety hazard and when not incompatible with any federal law. Easterwood,
113 S.Ct. at 1743 (1993).
20.

The Court in Easterwood found for CSX, who had argued that Easterwood's claim

was preempted because the federal speed limits are regulations covering the subject matter of
the common law of train speeds. The Court further stated that to hold otherwise would be to
deprive the Secretary of the power to preempt state common law, a power clearly conferred
by § 434. Therefore, the Court found that Easterwood's reliance on the common law was
incompatible with both the FRSA and the Secretary's regulations. Id. at 1743.
21.

In the case now before this Court, defendant argues that its train was traveling well

below the federally imposed speed limit of 60 m.p.h. for freight trains. "The fact that the
Union Pacific had set a lower 'timetable' speed limit than that specified by the FRA is
irrelevant since any claim based upon a violation of the railroad set limit would be but a
variation of plaintiffs common law negligence claim of excessive or unreasonable speed."
See Defendant's Memorandum in Support at 8, t 1.
22.

Plaintiff argues that, because defendant filed its timetable with the FRA pursuant to

49 C.F.R. 217, the Court should consider that action as evidence that the maximum
authorized speed at the intersection of the collision is 50 m.p.h. and that timetables filed with
the FRA are therefore enforceable against the defendant, and train speeds in excess of those
timetables violate federal law. See Affidavit of Bruce Reading (plaintiffs Memorandum in
Opposition, Exhibit 1). Furthermore, plaintiff claims that this case is distinguishable from
Easterwood because there is no attempt to impose on Union Pacific a state-enforced speed
regulation which is more stringent than its federal counterpart. Instead, plaintiff claims that
defendant's train was exceeding its own maximum authorized timetable speed, thus violating
federal law, and that defendant was therefore negligent.
23.

Given the ruling in Easterwood and the parties' arguments, the issue now before the

Court is (a) whether Union Pacific's timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. for freight trains is a
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variation of plaintiffs common law negligence claim of excessive speed and thus preempted
by federal law governing the "subject area," or (b) whether the FRSA covers speed limits
self-imposed by Union Pacific and, if not, whether defendant was negligent in exceeding its
speed limit for freight trains.
24.

The FRSA specifically permits states to adopt or continue in force any state law,

rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary
adopts a regulation covering the subject matter of such state requirement. This legislation
was designed to prevent states from interfering with regulations established by the FRA. In
this case, it is clear that the FRA had designated an "authorized speed limit" of 60 m.p.h.
for freight trains traveling along this stretch of track. However, the State of Utah has not
attempted to impose a more stringent law, rule, or regulation regarding authorized train
speed. Instead, Union Pacific has created its own timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. The Court
finds the present case to be distinguishable from Easterwood, where the State of Georgia
tried to impose law, rules, or regulations governing train speed. The Court in Easterwood
did not explain how the FRSA addresses the question of timetable speeds which are a) selfimposed by railroad companies and not by States; and b) lower than the federally authorized
train speeds.
25.

In his affidavit, plaintiffs witness Bruce Reading alleges that, under federal law,

each railroad company is required to file a copy of its Operating Rules and Timetables with
the FRA, and concludes that the speed limits mandated in the Union Pacific Railroad
Company Operating Rules and Timetables thus become the federally mandated guidelines and
maximum speed limits for the railroad company and are enforceable by the FRA. See
Affidavit of Bruce Reading, f 1 4-9, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 1.
Accordingly, Union Pacific's self-imposed timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. would become its
federally authorized speed and could not be preempted by the FRA.
26.

Defendant argues that 49 C.F.R. § 217 does not authorize timetables to change the

federal speed limits set in 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 and that timetable filings therefore have no
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effect on the maximum speeds at which a railroad may operate its trains. According to
defendant, section 217 requires only the filing of operating rules and timetables, which may
or may not contain speed limits, and does not require that speed limit changes be filed with
the FRA. Defendant again turns to the Easterwood decision and argues that it is § 213.9
which sets the "ceiling" or "maximum" speed, not timetables, and asserts that "[i]mplicit in
such holding is the understanding that while a railroad may not exceed such limit, it may by
internal fiat voluntarily operate its trains at any slower speed deemed appropriate." See
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support at 4.
27.

The Easterwood case does not provide any clear rule as to how one should address

the issue of timetable speeds within 49 C.F.R. §§ 217 and 213.9. However, plaintiff has
equally failed to provide any case law which would substantiate her claim that Union
Pacific's timetable filing under § 217 has an effect on the maximum speed at which a
railroad may operate its train under § 213.9. Defendant has provided the Court with the
recent case of Southern Pacific Tramp. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Oregon, 9 F.3d 807
(9th Cir. 1993), which supports defendant's argument that the FRA, by requiring Union
Pacific to file its timetable speed limits, does not thereby adopt that timetable limit as a
federal law enforceable against the railroad and preemptive of the speed limits set forth in 49
C.F.R. §213.9. In Southern Pacific, an Oregon law permitted local authorities to ban the
sounding of locomotive whistles under certain conditions. Southern Pacific Transportation
Company argued that the state law was preempted by three federal statutes and moved for
summary judgment. The state of Oregon made a cross-motion for summary judgment,
claiming that its regulations were not preempted as a matter of law. Following the Supreme
Court's decision in Easterwood, the circuit court held that the state law and regulations were
not preempted by any of the three federal statutes cited by Southern Pacific and affirmed the
district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the State of Oregon.
28.

In addressing Southern Pacific's claim that the Oregon statute was also preempted

by 45 C.F.R. § 217, which requires railroads to keep their operating rules on file with the
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FRA, the circuit court stated that ff[b]ecause the FRA neither approves nor adopts the
railroad's rules in any manner, the rules do not have the force of law and therefore cannot
preempt the Oregon statute." Southern Pacific, 9.F3d at 812 n.5. This statement is equally
applicable in the case now before this Court, in that it supports defendant's argument that 49
C.F.R. § 217 does not authorize timetables to change the federal speed limits set in 49
C.F.R. § 213.9. The railroad's rules and timetable filings submitted to the FRA in
accordance with section 217 are not approved or adopted by the FRA and therefore do not
have the force of law.
29.

Even if defendant were bound by its timetable speed of 50 m.p.h., there still

remain the questions of (a) whether Union Pacific was negligent in exceeding that speed, and
(b) if the train's speed was a proximate cause of the collision.
30.

The train's speed in this matter was not a causal factor unless the train could have

stopped, prior to collision, from the point at which plaintiff first saw the danger. The Court
agrees with the holding in Dombeck v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 129
N.W.2d 185 (Wise. 1964). In that case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that, even
under an assumption that the train's speed was negligent, such speed as a matter of law could
not be causal:
In order to be causal the train's speed must either have misled . . . the
driver of the car or it must have interfered with the control and
management of the train to the extent of rendering it probable that such
control and management would have otherwise been effective to have
avoided the collision.
Id. at 192. As to the first prong of this test, whether Brinkmeier, as driver, or plaintiff, as
passenger, were misled as to the speed of the train, plaintiff stated in her affidavit that she
did not see the train prior to the collision, nor did she hear the train blow its whistle or
sound its horn prior to the collision. See Affidavit of Alicia Jensen, \\ 7-8, Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 3. In his recorded statement, Mr. Brinkmeier also
stated that he did not hear the train or its horn. See the recorded statement of Bruce
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Brinkmeier at 15, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 4. The Court finds that,
because both plaintiff and Brinkmeier admit that they were not looking or listening for a
train, and because both stated that they never saw or heard the train prior to impact, neither
could have been misled as to the speed of the train in estimating its time of arrival at the
crossing. As to the second prong of this test, whether the train's speed interfered with the
control and management of the train to the extent of rendering it probable that such control
and management would have otherwise been effective to have avoided the collision, the
Court finds that plaintiff has made no argument or produced any evidence that the train could
have been stopped or sufficiently slowed to have allowed plaintiff's automobile to safely
cross the tracks if the train had indeed been traveling 50 m.p.h. at the time the engineer
activated the emergency brakes. Defendant, however, provided the Court with the Affidavit
of Ryan Puffer, the engineer. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. In his
affidavit, Engineer Puffer stated that he placed the train into emergency braking as soon as
he saw plaintiffs automobile, because it was his impression that the car was not going to
stop and was going to come onto the track directly in front of the train. He further stated
that "[a] long heavy train takes a number of seconds, after placing it into emergency braking,
before it even begins to slow down. On this occasion the train did not even begin to slow
down before the accident happened." Id. at 1 11. In addition, defendant provided the Court
with the affidavit of George E. Ohlsson, Manager of Operating Practices for Union Pacific
Railroad Company. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F. In his affidavit,
Mr. Ohlsson stated that the small difference between the 50 m.p.h. timetable speed and an
actual speed of approximately 51 m.p.h. "would not have made any significant difference in
terms of how far the train would have gone before slowing down or stopping after the brakes
were applied. A matter of 1 m.p.h. is, in my opinion, insignificant in terms of stopping time
and distance." Id. at f 10.
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31.

For these reasons, the Court finds that, even if the train had been traveling one or

two miles above the timetable speed limit of 50 m.p.h., the train's speed was not a
proximate cause of the accident.
Dangerous Crossing
32.

According to the Utah Supreme court in English v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 P.47

(1896), a crossing that is "more than ordinarily hazardous" places an additional duty of care
on the railroad. Plaintiff argues that several conditions existed at the time of the accident
which created a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing. These conditions include (a) an
auction barn near the tracks accompanied by the busy nature of a livestock auction; and (b)
trucks and trailers parked near the crossing which may have impeded vision or caused
plaintiff to not hear the train as it approached. According to plaintiff, the accident occurred
during a time when the commotion and noise of a livestock auction rendered the nearby
crossing "more than ordinarily hazardous."
33.

More recently, the Utah Court of Appeals applied the English standard of "more

than ordinarily hazardous" in Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 749 P.2d
660 (Utah App. 1988). In Gleave, the plaintiff was hit by an empty coal train at a crossing
in Springville, Utah. The court instructed the jury that "UDOT was statutorily given
ultimate responsibility for crossing design and warning and safety devices and that,
accordingly, [the jury] could not find Rio Grande negligent 'based upon any defects which
might exist with respect to the design of the 1600 South crossing or based upon any problems
you may perceive in the lack of traffic warning devices' there." Id. at 663. The jury found
the crossing to be more than ordinarily hazardous and then further found that Rio Grande
failed to exercise reasonable care in driving the train across the roadway "given the
crossing's design, its physical characteristics, and the existing warning signs." Id. at 664.
The conditions that contributed to this "hazardous" crossing in Gleave included a dangerous
crossing angle, a mound of earth, and a curving track.
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34.

In Duncan v. Union Pacific R.R., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992), a car containing a

driver and three passengers was struck by a freight train in Tooele County on Droubay Road.
While the road intersected the track at 43 degrees on the north and 136 degrees on the south,
nothing obstructed the motorist's view of the tracks for several thousand feet. The Utah
Supreme court in Duncan affirmed the trial court's finding that the "crossing was not 'more
than ordinarily hazardous' because plaintiffs could not demonstrate, or even suggest, what
more Union Pacific could have done to make this crossing safer, short of installing automatic
warning lights and signs and gates, which admittedly was not its responsibility." Id. at 833.
However, the Duncan court did reiterate the criteria used in the English case to determine
whether a crossing would be found to be more than ordinarily hazardous:
[A] crossing might be found to be more than ordinarily hazardous if it was
in a thickly populated portion of a city; if the view of the tracks was
obstructed because of the railroad itself or natural objects; if the crossing
was frequented by heavy traffic so that approaching trains could not be
heard; or if, for any reason, devices employed at the crossing were
rendered inadequate to warn the public of the danger of an approaching
train.
Id. at 834 (quoting English, 13 Utah at 419-20, 45 P. at 50 (1896)).
35.

In light of the criteria set forth in English and reiterated in Duncan, the plaintiff in

this case now argues that conditions present at the time of the accident, namely the auction
barn and the traffic and commotion which accompany a livestock auction, meet the criteria of
a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing. Plaintiff further argues that a factfinder should
therefore be allowed to determine if the crossing was hazardous and, if so, whether
defendant exercised reasonable care when driving the train across this particular railroad
crossing.
36.

While not agreeing that the crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous, defendant

argues that, assuming arguendo, "such a scenario does not impose a duty upon Union Pacific
to reduce the train's speed below the federally mandated limit." See defendant's
Memorandum in Support at 9, ^ 1. Defendant argues that the plaintiff in Easterwood also
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alleged unsafe crossing conditions requiring additional warning devices. However, despite
the Easterwood court's finding that plaintiff may have had a viable claim for an unsafe
crossing, the Court found that the railroad had no duty to reduce the train's speed below the
federal limit. Defendant argues that its train was traveling 10 m.p.h. below the federal limit
and that because the FRA sets train speeds with crossing safety concerns already in mind,
plaintiffs allegation of defendant's failure to reduce the speed of its train through the "more
than ordinarily hazardous" crossing is unfounded.
37.

Defendant further argues that, when a crossing is deemed to be extrahazardous, a

railroad's duty of care is limited to those unsafe conditions which it created or over which it
has responsibility. See defendant's Reply Memorandum at 13. Defendant cites Gleave v.
Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and Duncan v.
Union Pacific R. Co., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1990), in alleging that a railroad's duty of care
extends only to obstructions to view or sound caused by the railroad or located on railroad
right of way or property. Defendant then cites Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-19, which places a
duty of care on property owners to remove vegetation or other obstructions on their property
which constitute a traffic hazard by obstructing the view of any motor vehicle operator, and
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-14 et seq., which delegates to the Utah Department of Transportation
(UDOT) the responsibility for regulating the safe travel of motorists on roads and highways,
including those which pass over and across railroad tracks.
38.

This Court finds that, even if a jury could determine the existence of conditions that

would make the accident site a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing, those conditions
were not the responsibility of defendant. The noise around the auction was not something
within defendant's control. The fact that there were "No Parking" signs posted around the
area following the accident to prevent parked cars from obstructing drivers' views of the
railroad track does not imply any lack of care on defendant's part prior to the accident, since
such precautions are not the defendant's responsibility.
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39.

For these reasons, the Court finds that, even if the railroad crossing was a "more

than ordinarily hazardous" crossing when a livestock auction was in progress, any unusually
hazardous conditions resulting from the auction were not defendant's responsibility.
U.C.A § 56-1-14 (Locomotive Bells & Whistles)
40.

Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 governs the operation of locomotive whistle and bell

devices at public railroad crossings. It provides as follows:
Every locomotive shall be provided with a bell which shall be rung
continuously from a point not less than than 80 rods from any city or town
street or public highway grade crossing until such city or town street or
public highway grade shall be crossed, but, except in towns and at
terminal points, the sounding of the locomotive whistle or siren at least
1/4 of a mile before reaching any such grade crossing shall be deemed
equivalent to ringing the bell as aforesaid. . .
Id. According to defendant, where the grade crossing is in a rural area such as the one in
question, the requirement is that either the bell or the whisde must be operated beginning "at
least" 1320 feet from the crossing. Defendant argues that Engineer Puffer sounded both the
bell and the whistle approximately 1/4 of a mile from the crossing, well in excess of the
statutorily required distance of 1320 feet.
41.

Plaintiff argues that neither the driver nor the passenger of the car ever heard the

train's whistle or bells prior to the accident. See Affidavit of Alicia Jensen, Plaintiffs
Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 3, and the recorded statement of Bruce Brinkmeier,
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 4. Plaintiff alleges that the Pulse Electronics
graph, attached to the Affidavit of Bruce Reading, indicates that no whistles or bells were
sounded by the train as it approached the crossing. Plaintiff points to the statements of
several witnesses who were near the crossing at die time of the accident. In their voluntary
statements to police, Gerald and Whitney Hill made no mention of the train's whistle or bells
at the time of the accident. Other witnesses also made voluntary statements to police and
said nothing about hearing the train's whistle or bells at the time of the accident. However,
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plaintiff has not provided the Court with any such statements in affidavit form, as required
by Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
42.

The failure of the Pulse Electronics graph to record the whistle or bells of the train

prior to the accident is explained by George E. Ohlsson in his Supplemental Affidavit. Mr.
Ohlsson stated that the event recorder device installed on the locomotive used only 8-track
cassettes, which do not have sufficient channels to record everything relative to the operation
of the train; specifically, the 8-track cassette does not have a channel for showing whether
the horn or whistle was being sounded. See Supplemental Affidavit of George E. Ohlsson, \
2. Mr. Ohlsson further stated that Union Pacific is beginning to replace the 8-track cassette
event recorders with solid state event recorders which are capable of recording the sounding
of a train's whistle. Id. at t 4. Furthermore, there is testimony in the police record to
support defendant's claim that the train did sound its whistle and bells at some point before
reaching the crossing, and that there were witnesses to the accident who did hear the train's
wnistle and bells. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit A (Voluntary
Statements of Johnny Starks and Robert Craw). Ryan Puffer, engineer of the train, stated
that he began sounding the whistle and the bells approximately 1/4 mile away from the
crossing at 5950 South, and then continued operating the bells and whistle from 5950 South
for another 1100 feet until the train reached the crossing at 650 West where the accident
occurred. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit C.
43.

The Court finds that, despite plaintiffs reference to the voluntary statements of

witnesses who said nothing about having heard the train's bells or whistle, plaintiff did not
submit any affidavits to that effect in accordance with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Furthermore, there is no evidence to indicate that
those witnesses were in a position to hear the bells and whistles if they had in fact been
sounded. Conversely, defendant submitted the affidavit of the train's engineer, Ryan Puffer,
who stated that he checked the train prior to leaving Milford to verify that the brakes,
whistle, and headlights worked properly. Mr. Puffer also stated that he sounded the train's
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bells and whistles for over 1/4 of a mile prior to reaching the crossing at 5950 South, and
continued to sound the whistle beyond that crossing because he knew there was another
crossing (the 650 West crossing) shortly beyond the 5950 South crossing. Finally, Mr.
Puffer stated that he was sounding the whistle continuously as he watched the truck and horse
trailer cross the tracks just ahead of plaintiffs automobile.
44.

The Court finds the affidavit evidence presented is uncontradicted and that

defendant did appropriately sound the train's bells and whistle as warning.
Conclusion
45.

The Court concludes (a) that the speed of defendant's train was not a proximate

cause of the accident; (b) that defendant was not responsible for any conditions which may
have been present at the time of the accident and creating a "more than ordinarily hazardous"
crossing; and (c) that defendant did sound the train's bells and whistle as it approached the
crossing. Therefore, the Court finds no genuine issues of material fact remain as to
defendant's liability to plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court grants defendant's Motion For
Summary Judgment.
Counsel for defendant is to prepare, within 15 days of the date hereof, an order
consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to
form prior to submission to the Court for signature.
Dated at Provo, Utah this 15th day of May, 1995.
BY-THETSOURT:

JUDCffe BOYD L. PARK
cc:

J. Clare Williams
Allen Young
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J. CLARE WILLIAMS, #3490
MORRIS 0 HAGGERTY, #5283
Attorneys for Defendant
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY
406 West 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1151
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

ALECIA JENSEN,
Plaintiffs,
vs.

)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

)

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY
Defendant.

)
)

Civil No. 940400280

)

Judge Boyd L. Park

Defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for
hearing by the Court on April 17, 1995; with defendant being represented by I Clare Williams
and plaintiff, who was present in the courtroom, being represented by Allen K. Young; and with
the parties having filed written briefs and exhibits and having argued their respective positions to
the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now rules as follows:
The Court finds and concludes:
(1)

That the speed of defendant's train was not a proximate cause of the

accident;
(2)

That defendant was not responsible for any conditions which may have

been present at the time of the accident and created a "more than ordinarily hazardous"

crossing; and
(3)

That defendant did sound the train's bell and whistle as it approached the

crossing.
Therefore, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact to prevent
it from acting on defendant's motion as a matter of law.
Accordingly, the Court hereby grants defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and
orders plaintiffs Complaint dismissed w^th prejudice, with each party to pay its own costs and
expenses.
DATED this ty day of June, 1995.
BY THE COURT:

BOYDYPARK
Approved as to form this
of
, 1995.

Allen K. Young
Attorney for Plaintiff

day

